Promoting cooperation and trust in “noisy” situations: The power of generosity by Klapwijk, A. & Lange, P.A.M. van
Promoting Cooperation and Trust in “Noisy” Situations:
The Power of Generosity
Anthon Klapwijk
VU University Amsterdam
Paul A. M. Van Lange
VU University Amsterdam and Leiden University
The authors present an interdependence theoretical framework and advance the argument that generosity
serves the important purpose of communicating trust, which is assumed to be of utmost importance to
coping with incidents of negative noise (i.e., when the other every now and then behaves less cooper-
atively than intended). Using a new social dilemma task (the parcel delivery paradigm), it was
hypothesized that incidents of negative noise would exert detrimental effects on trust and trust-related
judgments and experiences, as well as cooperation, and that relative to tit for tat and self-regarding
strategies (stingy or unconditionally cooperative strategies), other-regarding strategies (i.e., unconditional
cooperation and generosity) would be more effective at reducing such as detrimental effects. Results from
2 studies provided strong support for these hypotheses, suggesting that the power of generosity is
underestimated in the extant literature, especially in its ability to maintain or build trust, which is essential
for coping with noise.
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One of the greatest challenges to interpersonal relations is
rooted in social dilemmas or conflicts between self-interest and
collective interest. After all, it is tempting to benefit from other’s
cooperation and not always reciprocate the other’s cooperation.
Yet people often seem to be able to maintain lasting cooperation
not only with their close partners but also with casual friends,
colleagues, and sometimes even relative strangers on the street
(e.g., Van Lange, De Cremer, Van Dijk, & Van Vugt, 2007). One
key question is, how can people maintain lasting cooperation in
social dilemmas? Should one respond in kind, giving exactly as
much as one has received? Should one give more than one has
received or less? What thoughts and feelings are elicited by a
partner’s generosity, responding in kind, and stinginess? Common
wisdom is often contradictory, in that sometimes wisdom is asso-
ciated with being other regarding and doing good for others (e.g.,
what goes around, comes around) and sometimes wisdom is asso-
ciated rather with being self-regarding and doing good for oneself
(e.g., nice guys finish last).1
Decades of social dilemma research, consisting of thousands of
studies, appear to converge on the following conclusion: Do unto
others what they do unto you. Indeed, numerous studies have
demonstrated that, in repeated social dilemmas, a reciprocating
strategy, called tit for tat, is more effective at eliciting cooper-
ation than most other strategies, including an unconditionally
cooperative strategy (see Axelrod, 1984; Oskamp, 1971; see
also McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Patchen, 1987). Clearly,
past research has made an immeasurable contribution to under-
standing the behavioral responses elicited by various interpersonal
strategies, thereby often using a classic version of the prisoner’s
dilemma game. However, it is also true that this immense literature
has devoted almost no attention to the thoughts and feelings (e.g.,
judgments of other’s personality, interaction goals, overall affective
evaluations) elicited by these strategies (like tit for tat). Also, past
research has given very little attention to the influence of some key
structural features that may help us understand why tit for tat is so
effective or whether there might be alternative strategies that are even
more effective in eliciting cooperation.
1 The terms other regarding and self-regarding are derived from the
recent literature on the evolutionary approaches to cooperation (e.g., Gin-
tis, 2007; Henrich et al., 2006; Silk et al., 2005). Also, we should note that
in the remainder of the article, we use the concept of reciprocity in a
specific sense, referring to the tendency of people to reciprocate coopera-
tion with cooperation and noncooperation with noncooperation. Also, strict
reciprocity is defined in terms of interaction qualities of tit for tat (except
for the first choice), that is, when people very precisely reciprocate the
degree of cooperation that they received from the other in the past inter-
action (see Kollock, 1993; Nowak & Sigmund, 1992; Van Lange et al.,
2002). We acknowledge, however, that the concept of reciprocity has a
broader meaning in the tradition of social exchange theory (e.g., Homans,
1961) or in alternative models of social interaction (e.g., reciprocity in
self-disclosure) that are rooted in various conceptual frameworks.
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The present research seeks to bridge this gap in several impor-
tant respects. First, we present a novel framework, rooted in
interdependence theory (Kelley et al., 2003), which conceptualizes
social interaction in terms of features of the situation and both
persons (i.e., the so-called SABI model, described below). Second,
we examine not only behavioral responses (as in most past re-
search) but also trust, judgments of other’s personality, judgments
of other’s interaction goals (i.e., perceived transformations), and
affective evaluations. Third, as a key structural feature, we suggest
that the effectiveness of strategies may be strongly shaped by
noise, defined as discrepancies between intended and actual out-
comes for an interaction partner due to unintended errors (cf.
Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Bendor, Kramer, & Stout, 1991; Kollock,
1993; Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002). We argue that
human cooperation is particularly challenged by negative noise,2
that is, errors that cause actual outcomes to be worse than intended,
such as accidentally saying the wrong thing or not responding to an
e-mail because of a network breakdown, and that may lead to
misunderstanding. However, surprisingly few studies have sought
to capture negative noise (henceforth, noise), even though it un-
derlies many situations in everyday life and often gives rise to
uncertainty and misunderstanding, thereby activating important
psychological processes such as trust, judgments of another’s
interaction goals, and affective evaluations. Thus, it becomes im-
portant to examine whether noise may exert detrimental effects on
cooperation and to evaluate the effectiveness of tit for tat and other
strategies in their ability to cope with noise.
The major purpose of the present research is to increase our
understanding of the psychological consequences of various inter-
personal strategies in social dilemmas with noise and without
noise. Specifically, Study 1 compared three classic strategies (un-
conditional noncooperation, tit for tat, and unconditional cooper-
ation), whereas Study 2 compared three strategies that are entirely
reciprocal (tit for tat) or largely reciprocal, namely, generous (i.e.,
giving somewhat more than received) or stingy (i.e., giving some-
what less than received). We used concepts and principles derived
from interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Kelley et
al., 2003) for characterizing these strategies in terms of outcome
transformations (i.e., in terms of motives, such as maximizing joint
outcomes and minimizing absolute differences in outcomes for self
and other: MaxJoint and MinDiff, respectively. This transforma-
tional analysis was then used to advance a framework for under-
standing how incidents of noise may undermine cooperation, trust,
perceived transformations and evaluations of strength and morality
(cf. Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986; Van Lange &
Kuhlman, 1994), and affective evaluations. One key hypothesis is
that cooperation, as well as perceptions of the partner’s transfor-
mations, is undermined by noise but more so for tit for tat than for
strategies that are driven by other-regarding transformations and
communicate generosity (i.e., giving more than one has received).
An Interdependence Analysis of Interpersonal Strategies
in Noisy Social Dilemmas
How can we understand the psychological consequences of
interpersonal strategies? Also, how can we understand structural
consequences of social situations (e.g., noise)? Classic and recent
formulations of interdependence theory expand Lewin’s (1936)
well-known formula, B ! f(P, E), by stating that an interaction (I)
between two individuals (or Persons A and B) can be conceptu-
alized in terms of needs, thoughts, and motives in relation to one
another in the context of the specific social situation (S) in which
their interaction transpires (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Kelley et al.,
2003; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). This model can be expressed
in the equation, I! f(S, A, B) and is often captured by its acronym:
SABI (Holmes, 2002; Kelley et al., 2003; see also Rusbult & Van
Lange, 2003; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997; Van
Lange et al., 2007). In the following, we outline how the SABI
model can increase our understanding of how people respond to
other’s behavior in noisy social dilemmas.
The Situation
In classic formulations of interdependence theory, the situation
(S) is defined by classic features such as degree of dependence,
mutuality of dependence, and degree of corresponding versus
conflicting interest (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). As noted earlier, in
the present research, we examined social dilemmas, situations
characterized by a conflict between self-interest and collective
interest. Such situations can be interpreted as being diagnostic
(Holmes & Rempel, 1989; sometimes these situations are called
strain tests; cf. Kelley, 1983), that is, they provide a test in which
interaction partners’ true goals, values, and motives are revealed
(cf. Kelley, 1983; Kelley et al., 2003).
In more recent versions of interdependence theory, an important
dimension is added to the structural analysis of situations: infor-
mation availability or the degree to which information about one
another’s preferences and intentions is available (Kelley et al.,
2003; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). The availability of such
information about others—or the lack thereof—is of utmost im-
portance for understanding social interaction and is especially
pronounced in situations where action is likely to be misimple-
mented. As noted earlier, such situations may often be affected by
noise. Noise may have important implications for the functionality
of interpersonal strategies. For example, arriving late for an im-
portant meeting because of an unexpected traffic jam may give rise
to uncertainty and misunderstanding (e.g., “Why doesn’t he show
up?”), erroneous attributions (“He must have left home late”), and
wrongful impressions (e.g., “He probably is not dedicated to our
joint project”), and these, in a reciprocal environment, may cause
patterns of negative reciprocity (e.g., “Next time, I will make him
wait as well!”).
Persons A and B
In addition to the situation, Persons A and B (or the self and
the other) are logical building blocks for understanding social
2 Errors that cause outcomes to be better than intended are referred to as
positive noise. Although both types of noise may lead to misunderstanding,
we suggest that negative noise rather than positive noise, is particularly
likely to give rise to misunderstanding along with reduced levels of
cooperation. Also, it can be argued that negative noise is more prevalent in
everyday life than positive noise. Moreover, we have found that incidents
of negative noise exert stronger (negative) effects than incidents of positive
noise, which tend to exert weak effects (described in Van Lange et al.,
2002). Therefore, as in previous work on noise, we examine negative noise
in the present article.
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interaction. As for the self, we suggest that many people, perhaps
even a majority, tend to adhere to a very simple rule—to behave
roughly as cooperatively as the other did in the previous interac-
tion. Indeed, people exhibit a strong tendency to reciprocate oth-
er’s cooperation and noncooperation in the context of experimental
social dilemmas (e.g., Van Lange, 1999; see also Parks & Rumble,
2001). This explains to some degree that we often see enduring
forms of either cooperative interactions (when both cooperate) or
noncooperative interactions (when neither cooperates) rather than
enduring forms of interaction in which one cooperates while the
other benefits by not reciprocating. According to the SABI model,
the key issue is that the beliefs and goals that each person (A and
B) brings to bear on the situation, as well as how they shape one
another’s beliefs and goals through their interactions, are important
to understanding relatively enduring patterns of cooperative inter-
action. In doing so, people translate the behavior of others into
judgments regarding trust, specific interaction goals (i.e., per-
ceived transformations), personality impressions, and affective
evaluations. These processes are discussed next.
Meaning Analysis: From Strategies to
Perceived Transformations
The heart of the SABI model involves how persons A and B
interact in the context of a specific situation (S). We suggest that
how self interprets other’s behavior in noisy social dilemmas and
how this translates to trust should be a powerful determinant of
cooperative behavior. Such interpretation of other’s behavior has
been termed meaning analysis—a process by which people seek to
understand the reasons for an event that is occurring (cf. Bersc-
heid, 1983; Frijda, 1988; Weiner, 1986). Meaning analysis repre-
sents judgments of specific interaction goals and also trust, per-
sonality impressions, and affective summaries of interactions.
According to interdependence theory, meaning analysis is
strongly linked to the conceptual distinction between the given situ-
ation and the effective situation (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). The given
situation represents the consequences of own and other’s actions in
terms of gut-level, self-interested preferences. The effective situation
also represents the broader interpersonal consequences of own and
other’s actions—what do the outcomes mean for the other or for
future interactions with the other? A person may adopt one of several
outcome transformations (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Kelley et al.,
2003; Van Lange et al., 2007), including altruism, maximizing the
partner’s outcomes (MaxOther); cooperation, maximizing the joint
outcomes for self and partner (MaxJoint); equality, minimizing dif-
ferences between own and partner’s outcomes (MinDiff); competi-
tion, maximizing the relative advantage between own and partner’s
outcomes (MaxRel); and individualism, maximizing one’s own out-
comes irrespective of the partner’s outcomes (MaxOwn; Kelley &
Thibaut 1978; Messick & McClintock, 1968).
In the present research, we advance a framework (see Table 1)
in which we conceptualize the various interpersonal strategies in
terms of outcome transformations, that is, in terms of the primary
goals with which one may approach an interaction situation. We
also suggest that people are likely to translate observations of
another’s interactions (i.e., the other’s strategy) in terms of out-
come transformations that are central to interdependence theory. In
this framework, we conceptualize tit for tat in terms of equality
(MinDiff), in that, during interaction, tit for tat involves giving the
partner as much as one has received from the partner in a previous
interaction. As such, tit for tat takes an intermediate position on a
dimension of self-regarding transformations to other-regarding trans-
formations (even though the first choice is a cooperative choice and as
such is other regarding). As displayed in Table 1, the generous and
stingy strategies are conceptualized as other-regarding and self-
regarding variants of tit for tat, as they combine the equality motive
(MinDiff) with maximizing joint and other outcomes (MaxJoint/
MaxOther) and maximizing own and relative outcomes (MaxOwn/
MaxRel), respectively (see Bendor et al., 1991; Kollock, 1993; Van
Lange et al., 2002). According to interdependence theory, the per-
ceived transformations are central to understanding interpersonal
trust, judgments of the other’s personality (e.g., impressions of other’s
morality and strength), and overall affective evaluation (e.g., how
good or bad one feels about the interaction).
We suggest that incidents of noise exert detrimental effects on
cooperation, as well as on perceived transformations, trust, per-
ceived morality and strength, and affective evaluations. As noted
earlier, an incident of noise differs from the interaction patterns
that have been normal up to that point and typically brings about
outcomes that are more negative than one had expected on the
basis of previous interactions. As such, it becomes understandable
that after repeated incidents of noise, there will be a decline in
cooperation, other-regarding transformations, trust, impressions of
morality and strength, and overall affective evaluation.
Perhaps even more importantly, we suggest that strategies that
are somewhat more other regarding than the tit-for-tat strategy are
better able at coping with noise than the tit-for-tat strategy. How so?
First, if most people exhibit an inclination toward reciprocity, then a
few incidents of noise may pull them into the direction of reduced
cooperation. The reason is that both the self, whom we assume to be
largely reciprocal, and the other (i.e., tit-for-tat strategy) are likely to
reciprocate the observed (or inferred) behavior rather than the in-
tended behavior. Put differently, if both adhere to tit for tat, then
neither the self nor the partner can effectively pull each other into the
direction of enhanced cooperation because neither tends to behave
more cooperatively than the partner did in the previous interaction.
There is some indirect evidence from computer simulations suggest-
ing that the detrimental effects of noise can be reduced if at least one
of the two persons adds generosity to his or her strategy (Nowak &
Sigmund, 1992). As such, this explanation is a logical explanation that
rests on the assumption that most people adhere to tit for tat, at least
in response to tit-for-tat partners.
A second, complementary line of reasoning assumes that the
building of trust may serve as an important mechanism for coping
with noise. Specifically, the self is less likely to perceive an
incident of noise as intentional if the self has strong (rather than
weak) trust in the other. We assume that generosity is one of the key
mechanisms for building trust, in that it entails giving more than the
other has given. As such, the benign intent underlying generosity is
relatively unambiguous because the other outperforms one’s own
level of cooperation. Such communication and building of trust are
likely to help give the other the benefit of the doubt when dealing with
a new incident of noise. Hence, we assume that for generous partners,
people are less likely to adhere to strict reciprocity and therefore are
less likely to fall prey to negative reciprocity (or the echo effect),
which may even enhance possibilities for enhancing cooperation over
time. This mechanism highlights the psychology underlying
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differences between cooperative, generous partners; tit-for-tat part-
ners; and stingy, noncooperative partners.
Clearly, these mechanisms do not at all exclude each other.
Rather, we suggest that they are mutually supportive, in that
generosity may serve as mechanism for pulling people in the
direction of cooperation (rather than pulling them in the direction
of negative reciprocity) and for the building of trust. Moreover, it
is possible, if not likely, that relative to tit-for-tat partners, other-
regarding partners communicate an atmosphere in which people are
more likely to adopt a relaxed accounting system (Kollock, 1993), in
which people adhere less strongly to social bookkeeping and strict
forms of social exchange (Clark & Mills, 1979, 1993) than to gestures
of good will and perhaps relational trust (rather than calculus-based
trust; cf. Kramer, 1999; Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006;
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998).
Thus, we predicted the detrimental effects of noise to be more
pronounced for tit for tat than for other-regarding strategies. That
is, we expected that relative to other-regarding strategies, tit for tat
suffers more from noise, in that it causes a stronger decline in
cooperation, as well as in trust, other-regarding transformations,
impressions of morality,3 and affective evaluations.
Summary of Hypotheses
To summarize, we advanced two general hypotheses. Our first
general hypothesis was that incidents of noise would exert detri-
mental effects not only on observable behavior but also on under-
lying cognitions and feelings about the other that form the basis of
trust. More specifically, we expected noise to exert detrimental
effects on levels of cooperation (Hypothesis 1a) and general ex-
pressions of trust (Hypothesis 1b). Also, we predicted that noise
would exert effects on cognitive interpretations that people make
about behavior of others. First, we predicted that noise would exert
detrimental effects on the perception of other-regarding
transformations to others and that it would enhance the perception
of self-regarding transformations to others (Hypothesis 1c).
Second, we expected noise to exert detrimental effects on judg-
ments that people make about the morality (versus immorality) of
others (Hypothesis 1d; see footnote 3; for largely exploratory
purposes, we included judgments of strength, anticipating no
3 Research has revealed that individuals who are perceived as moral
elicit more cooperation than individuals who are perceived as immoral and
that individuals who are perceived as strong (e.g., those adopting a tit-for-
tat strategy; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988) elicit more cooperation from
others than individuals who are perceived as weak (Liebrand et al., 1986;
Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Also, people tend to give much weight to
morality information and little, if any, weight to information about strength
(morality-importance effect; for a review, see Wojciszke, 2005; also see De
Bruin & Van Lange, 1999a, 1999b, 2000). Reasoning from this research,
we suggest that communication of other-regarding transformations (i.e.,
MaxJoint and MaxOther) will be perceived as more moral and therefore
will elicit more cooperation. Moreover, these impressions of morality (i.e.,
doing the right thing) may serve as a buffer to possible incidents of noise.
Table 1
An Interdependence Framework for Understanding Participants’ Reactions to Behavioral Strategies of Others
Partner’s strategy
Unconditional
cooperation Generous Tit for tat Stingy
Unconditional
noncooperation
Orientation of partner Other regarding Other regarding Equality Self-regarding Self-regarding
Transformations by partner MaxOther/MaxJoint
(MaxOther,
MaxJoint)/MinDiff MinDiff
MinDiff/(MaxOwn,
MaxRel) MaxOwn/MaxRel
Noise-free situations
General
Level of cooperation High Very high Very high Low Very low
Trust Very high Very high High Low Very low
Cognitive interpretations
Personality judgments Weak/moral Moderately strong/
moral
Strong/moral Moderately
strong/immoral
Moderately
strong/immoral
Perceived transformations MaxOther/MaxJoint MinDiff/MaxJoint MinDiff/MaxJoint MaxOwn/MaxRel MaxOwn/MaxRel
Affective evaluations
Positive affect Very high Very high High Low Very low
Negative affect Very low Very low Low High Very high
Noisy situations
General
Level of cooperation High Very high Low Low Very low
Trust High High Low Low Very low
Cognitive interpretations
Personality judgments Moderately
strong/moral
Moderately
strong/moral
Moderately
strong/immoral
Moderately
strong/immoral
Moderately
strong/immoral
Perceived transformations MaxOther/MaxJoint MinDiff/MaxJoint MaxOwn/MaxRel MaxOwn/MaxRel MaxOwn/MaxRel
Affective evaluations
Positive affect High High Low Low Very low
Negative affect Low Low High High Very high
Note. MaxJoint ! maximizing the joint outcomes for self and partner; MaxOther ! maximizing the partner’s outcome; MaxOwn ! maximizing one’s
own outcomes irrespective of the partner’s outcomes; MaxRel ! maximizing the relative advantage between own and partner outcomes; MinDiff !
minimizing differences between own and partner’s outcomes.
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pronounced effects for noise). Third, we expected that noise would
exert effects on overall affective evaluations. We expected that
noise would exert detrimental effects on positive affect that people
experience regarding the behavior of others and that it would have
reverse effects on negative affect that people experience about
behavior of others (Hypothesis 1e).
Our second general hypothesis was that the effects of noise, as
predicted in Hypothesis 1, would be more pronounced for a tit-
for-tat partner than for either other-regarding (i.e., unconditionally
cooperative and generous) or self-regarding partners (i.e., uncon-
ditionally noncooperative and stingy).4 More specifically, we ex-
pected a pattern in which other-regarding partners—regardless of
the occurrence of noise—would elicit relatively high levels of
cooperation, trust, attribution of other-regarding transformations,
perceived morality, and positive affective evaluations, whereas
self-regarding partners would elicit relatively low levels of these
variables (Hypothesis 2a–2e).
Study 1
Our first experiment was designed to compare a tit-for-tat strat-
egy, pursuing equality (i.e., MinDiff), with unconditional cooper-
ation, primarily motivated to benefit the other (i.e., MaxJoint and
MaxOther), and unconditional noncooperation, primarily moti-
vated to benefit the self (i.e., MaxOwn and MaxRel). We studied
these particular strategies for two reasons: (a) They are classic
strategies in social dilemma research that have been studied very
often in noise-free settings (e.g., see Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975;
Van Lange & Visser, 1999; Wrightsman, O’Connor, & Baker,
1972), and (b) in doing so, we were able to compare the tit-for-tat
strategy, which is often regarded as a baseline, with both extreme
ends (other regardingness vs. self-regardingness) of our framework
(see Table 1).
Method
Participants and experimental design. Two hundred and four
participants (80 men, 124 women) with an average age of 21 years
took part in the present research. They were recruited at the
campus of the VU University (Amsterdam, the Netherlands) by
printed flyers. Each participant was paid €5 in exchange for
participation (at the time the study was conducted, €5 equaled $5
in American currency). The experimental design was a 3 (partner’s
strategy: unconditional cooperation, tit for tat, or unconditional
noncooperation) " 3 (noise: absent, low noise, or high noise) " 4
(blocks of trials) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the latter
variable being a within-participant variable (this variable is dis-
cussed shortly). The primary dependent variable was level of
cooperation.
Procedure. Eight to 15 participants attended each research
session. On arrival, each participant was greeted and escorted to
one of 15 cubicles, which prevented participants from communi-
cating with each other. The entire experiment was conducted on
Apple Macintosh computers, using a program written in Macro-
media Authorware.
The social dilemma task. The experiment started by explaining
to the participants that the computers in the different cubicles were
connected and that they would be paired to interact via computer
in a decision task for an unknown number of trials. Next, partic-
ipants read the instructions of the social dilemma task. We used a
paradigm in which participants delivered valuable parcels for each
other throughout a virtual city. By using this paradigm, we are able
to improve mundane realism in three ways. First, the task involves
unintended errors due to noise incidents (i.e., roadblocks that
obstruct the way to the place of delivery). Second, in this approach,
participants have to make an effort to enact cooperative behavior
(i.e., navigating through an unknown city). Third, because of the
nature of the task (i.e., delivery of parcels), the behavior of the
participants should reveal some inherent variability.
The social dilemma task consisted of eight trials, each of which
were divided into two parts (Part A and Part B). In Part A, the
participant was the sender of the parcel, and the preprogrammed
partner was the deliverer, and in Part B, the participant was the
deliverer, whereas the partner was the sender of the parcel. In this
way, the task involved a so-called sequential social dilemma, in
which the preprogrammed partner always acted first. We deliber-
ately chose to do this for two reasons. First, strategies differ in
terms of the trade-off between the degree of other regardingness
and the degree of exploitability (the degree to which a strategy is
vulnerable to being exploited by an interaction partner; cf. Axelrod
& Dion, 1988). By choosing a sequential setup, we wanted to
emphasize this trade-off: On the one hand, the preprogrammed
partner actually communicates a leap of faith by placing the
outcome of every trial in the hands of the participant. On the other
hand, participants are motivated to maximize their own gains by
exploiting the partner, at least to some extent, in every trial. A
second reason for choosing a sequential task is that many or most
everyday social interactions tend to be sequential in nature—in
fact, one may go as far as to claim that it is exceptionally rare for
people to be forced to make simultaneous decisions. Furthermore,
some previous work (e.g., Insko et al., 1998) revealed no differ-
ences for cooperation levels among dyads between sequential and
simultaneous social dilemma tasks.
When being the sender of the parcel (Part A), the participant was
shown a screen with the elapsed time, the income of the other, and
own costs (see Figure 1). Also, the following text was displayed on
the screen: “The other is delivering your parcel. It depends on the
other how much time this will take. A moment please!” When being
the deliverer of the parcel (Part B), the participant was shown a map
of a city with streets, woods, and houses (see Figure 2). As can be
seen in Figure 2, the participant was represented on the map with a
blue ball, and the location where the parcel should be delivered was
indicated with a yellow flag. The distance between the ball and the
flag was the same for all rounds. Before the task started, the partic-
ipants received 3 s to find out the exact location of the ball and the
flag on the map. This was to avoid individual differences in visual
focusing that might influence the results. Participants could move
through the city by clicking the mouse pointer on one of four red
arrows around the blue ball; the ball would move to the next
intersection in the intended direction. In this way, participants
could wander freely through the city. The parcel was delivered
when the participants moved the blue ball over the yellow flag.
4 For the self-regarding partners, we did not expect detrimental effects of
(negative) noise because we anticipated a natural floor effect, that is, the
level of cooperation may already be low when negative noise incidents are
absent and, as a consequence, cannot get much lower.
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Both parts of a trial lasted no longer than 25 s. The level of
cooperation was measured by the amount of time the participants
took to deliver the parcel. Deliverers were paid per time unit:
Every second they were busy delivering, they earned €0.60. So, it
was in their direct self-interest to stay on the road as long as
possible (like a taxi driver). For the senders of the parcel, the
delivery was costly, they lost €1.40 per second. It was in the
interest of the sender that the delivery come as fast as possible. As
can be seen in Table 2, maximum cooperation would be to deliver
the parcel in 5 s. The participant would then earn €3.00 (5 "
€0.60), and the sender would lose €7.00 (5 " €1.40) of his or her
€35 budget. Minimum cooperation would be to not deliver the
parcel or to deliver it in exactly 25 s. This would result in an
outcome of €15.00 (25 " €0.60) for the deliverer and an outcome
of €0.00 (€35.00 minus 25 " €1.40) for the sender. At the end of
every trial, the earnings of Parts A and B were summed to obtain
the total outcomes. Table 2 provides an overview of the outcome
structure of the social dilemma.
The social dilemma task included four equivalent blocks of
trials. Participants were not informed about the total number of
eight trials. After explaining the social dilemma task, we admin-
istered four questions to check comprehension of the task. Before
being able to proceed, the participants had to answer three out of
four questions correctly. When two or more questions were an-
swered incorrectly, the instructions were displayed again. The
majority of the participants (84.3%) passed this test the very first
time, and 96.6% of the participants passed after having read the
instructions twice, so the test questions revealed good comprehen-
sion by the participants. After the comprehension checks, partici-
pants did two practice trials. In the second practice trial, partici-
pants were asked to deliver the parcel as quickly as possible, to
determine their maximum delivery speed. This measure gave us
the ability to control for individual differences in task performance
later on in the analysis.
The outcomes in the social dilemma task were presented in
European currency. As in previous experiments (e.g., Van
Lange, 1999; Van Lange & Visser, 1999), we informed partic-
ipants that the amount of money was hypothetical but that by
earning more money they would increase their chances of
winning a €15 book or CD gift certificate. That is, we stated
that the amount of hypothetical money earned for themselves
corresponded to the number of tickets in a raffle for the gift
certificates, making clear that their chances would increase by
the amount of money they earned for themselves during the
task, not by the amount of money they earned more than the
other participants in this experiment.
Manipulation of the partner’s strategy. The tit-for-tat partner
was programmed to start delivering the parcel in 17 s, a mod-
erately cooperative move (see also Tazelaar, Van Lange, &
Ouwerkerk, 2004; Van Lange et al., 2002). In this way, the
behavior of the preprogrammed partner was realistic, while, at
the same time, the partner showed reasonably good intentions.
In subsequent trials, the tit-for-tat partner was programmed to
deliver the parcel in the same number of seconds as the partic-
ipant had in the previous trials. The cooperative partner and the
noncooperative partner were programmed to deliver the parcel
in 9 s (high cooperation) and 22 s (low cooperation), respec-
tively. To make sure that the behavior of the preprogrammed
Figure 1. The screen that is displayed to the participants when the partner is the deliverer. Note that in the
original experiment, the text was in Dutch.
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partner was somewhat realistic, we programmed the computer
to add or subtract 1 s in Trials 1, 3, 5, and 7 (these were the
trials in which noise was absent in all conditions). In the other
trials, we did not make such a correction, as it would influence
the manipulation of noise.
Manipulation of noise for the preprogrammed partner. Prior
to making choices in the social dilemma, participants were in-
formed about the possible occurrence of noise during the experi-
ment. In previous research (Van Lange et al., 2002), participants in
the conditions without noise did not receive instructions about
noise. Obviously, in real life, people may be aware of noise in their
lives without actually experiencing it for a period of time. Conse-
quently, in our new paradigm, we provided all the participants with
exactly the same information. In doing so, we sought to establish
a basic understanding of noise in all experimental conditions,
while we manipulated the actual appearance of noise in the noise
conditions only.
In the parcel delivery paradigm, noise was operationalized by
supposedly random roadblocks that could appear at intersections
of the city map (see Figure 2). We explained to the participants that
for every trial, they and their interaction partner could face one of
three options (which need not necessarily be the same for the two
partners): (a) There were no roadblocks present; (b) there were
roadblocks present, but they did not obstruct the path to the goal
(i.e., unharmful roadblocks); and (c) there were roadblocks present
that did obstruct the path to the goal and would cause a delay of
about 7 s (i.e., harmful roadblocks).
In reality, only the preprogrammed partner encountered harmful
roadblocks, resulting in a 7-s delay on top of the intended delivery
time (which was dependent on the strategy conditions). After
analyzing the results of a pilot study, we determined that 7 s seemed
to be a reasonable noise intensity that was unlikely to go unnoticed by
the participants. Participants, however, experienced occasional un-
harmful roadblocks in some of the trials, which served as a reminder
of the possible occurrence of noise in their behavior.
Table 2
Payoff Structure of the Parcel Paradigm
Partner’s behavior
Own behavior
Maximum
cooperation (5 s)
Minimum
cooperation (25 s)
Maximum cooperation (5 s) ε31/ε31 ε3/ε43
Minimum cooperation (25 s) ε43/ε3 ε15/ε15
Note. This payoff structure meets the formal criteria set for prisoner’s
dilemmas: The temptation to defect (ε43) has the largest outcome, followed
by reward for mutual cooperation (ε31), punishment for mutual defection
(ε15), and the sucker’s payoff (ε3). Also, the sum of the temptation to
defect and the sucker’s payoff is smaller than 2 times the reward for
cooperation.
Figure 2. The screen that participants see when they are the deliverer (with roadblocks). Note that in the
original experiment, the text was in Dutch.
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As noted earlier, the actual social dilemma task included eight
interaction trials, in some of which noise influenced the behavior
of the preprogrammed partner. In the low-noise condition, two
trials included noise (25%), and in the high-noise condition, four
trials included noise (50%). In the high-noise condition, noise was
introduced at Trials 2, 4, 6, and 8. For half of the participants in the
low-noise condition, the partner experienced noise at Trials 4 and
8, and for the other half of the participants, the partner experienced
noise at Trials 2 and 6. This was to control for differences in
cooperation due to the onset of noise. We found no such differ-
ences (i.e., no main or interaction effects); therefore, we collapsed
the data across the two conditions, which we refer to as the
low-noise condition.
Measuring partner trust. Upon completion of the social di-
lemma task, participants proceeded with a questionnaire assessing
trust they had in their partner during the task. In assessing partner-
specific trust, we considered scales for assessing trust in ongoing
relationships (which include items asking about specific behaviors,
such as relying on the partner to keep the promises; e.g., Rempel,
Holmes, & Zanna, 1985) and scales assessing generalized inter-
personal trust (e.g., Rotter, 1967; Yamagishi, 1986). However, we
do not know of any instrument that is designed to assess partner-
specific trust that is based on a series of interactions with an
otherwise unknown other person. Hence, we designed a five-item
instrument assessing partner-specific trust (see the Appendix),
thereby focusing on some key items or constructs derived from the
above scales, such as self-reported trust (“I trust the other person
completely”; see Rotter, 1967; Yamagishi, 1986) or dependability
(“If push comes to shove, I do not want to rely on the other
person,” reverse coded; cf. Rempel et al., 1985; for more infor-
mation, see Van Lange, 2008). Participants could indicate how
much they agreed versus disagreed with these statements on scales
ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). The
scale exhibited good internal consistency (Cronbach’s # ! .87).
Measuring affective evaluations. Eight items assessed the feel-
ings that the participants experienced during the task. Items of the
positive scale were “The behavior of the other made me feel . . .
happy, contented, proud, enthusiastic” (Cronbach’s # ! .93), and
items of the negative scale were “The behavior of the other made me
feel . . . disappointed, frustrated, indignant, angry” (Cronbach’s # !
.91). Participants could indicate how much they agreed with these
statements on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
Measuring perceived transformations. Fifteen items assessed
participants’ perceived transformations. Each transformation was
indicated by three items, which showed good internal reliability:
MaxJoint, # ! .94 (e.g., “The other person wanted to get the most
outcomes for the two of us”); MinDiff, # ! .93 (e.g., “The other
person wanted to minimize the differences in outcomes for me and
the other”); MaxOther, # ! .89 (e.g., “The other person wanted
that I would get the most outcomes”); MaxRel, # ! .93 (e.g., “The
other person wanted to get more outcomes than I did”); and
MaxOwn, # ! .83 (e.g., “The other person wanted to get the most
outcomes for himself or herself”).
Measuring morality and strength judgments. Six items in-
tended to assess participants’ judgment of the partners in terms of
morality and strength. The items were based on earlier research on
impressions in social dilemmas (might vs. morality; e.g., Liebrand
et al., 1986; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Items of the morality
scale were “How . . . honest /dishonest, just/unjust, moral/immoral
. . . do you think the other is?” (Cronbach’s # ! .93). Items of the
strength scale were “How . . . weak/strong, powerless/powerful,
soft/firm . . . do you think the other is?” (Cronbach’s # ! .65).
Participants could indicate their judgments on s7-point scales.
Measuring tendency to reciprocate. Finally, we included a
six-item measure of participants’ inclination to reciprocate the
partner’s behavior (Cronbach’s # ! .78). This was to provide
evidence (albeit somewhat indirect) that reciprocity is a fairly
common response, which is important for understanding why noise
causes detrimental effects (i.e., if people were very generous, even
a reciprocal strategy would not suffer from noise). A positive item
was “If the other started to deliver the parcel slower, I immediately
decided to deliver slow as well,” and a negative item was “My
decisions were not influenced by the behavior of the other” (re-
verse coded). Again, participants could indicate how much they
agreed versus disagreed with these statements on scales ranging
from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree).
Results and Discussion
All dependent variables were analyzed in a 3 (partner’s strategy:
unconditional cooperation, tit for tat, or unconditional noncooper-
ation) " 3 (noise: absent, low, or high) ANOVA. For level of
cooperation only, we included the performance of the participants
on the second practice trial as a covariate in the analysis (thereby
making it formally an analysis of covariance [ANCOVA]). In
doing so, we sought to correct for possible individual differences
in performance on the social dilemma task (i.e., recall that, unlike
the first practice trial, we assessed participants’ maximum speed in
the second practice trial).5 We also examined the development of
cooperation level across four blocks of trials within participants.
Because we hypothesized that the noise-absent condition would be
different from the two noise conditions, we computed a noise-
versus-no-noise contrast. This planned contrast compared the
noise-absent condition with the two noise-present conditions. To
test whether the detrimental effects of noise are specifically more
pronounced for the tit-for-tat partner, we also computed a tit-for-
tat-versus-unconditional-strategies contrast. To find support for
Hypothesis 2, the interaction between these two contrasts should
be significant.6
Main effects for noise. Were there any detrimental effects for
noise (Hypothesis 1)? To find support for this hypothesis, the
analysis should yield significant effects for noise but, more im-
portantly, for the noise-versus-no-noise contrast. For reasons of
conciseness, we report only the main effects of the contrast
(whenever the contrast was significant, the main effect of noise
5 There were no between-conditions differences regarding the covariate,
and the uncorrected means were therefore quite similar to the estimated
marginal means; the latter are reported. Also, we did not include perfor-
mance as a covariate in the analysis of trust, transformations, perceived
morality and strength, and positive and negative effect. We should note that
an analysis including the covariate yielded virtually identical results.
6 For reasons of conciseness, we do not report the overall interaction
effects between partner’s strategy and noise. Whenever the hypothesized
effect between the noise-versus-no-noise contrast and the tit-for-tat-versus-
unconditional-strategies contrast was significant, the overall interaction
effect was also significant, with three exceptions: MaxRel, MaxOwn, and
negative affect, Fs(4, 195) ! 1.28, 1.39, and 1.47, all ns, respectively.
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was also significant). As we demonstrate below, the analysis
revealed the predicted effects for all dependent measures except
level of cooperation. Relevant means are displayed in Tables 3
and 4 (for significance tests of differences between the means,
see subscripts).
With respect to cooperation, we analyzed the time (in seconds)
that remained after the parcel was delivered such that a higher
score indicated a greater level of cooperation. The analysis re-
vealed no significant main effects for the noise-versus-no-noise
contrast, F(1, 194) ! 1.32, ns. However, we did find significant
effects for the contrast for trust,7 F(1, 195) ! 16.87, p $ .001; for
all the perceived transformations: MaxJoint, MaxOther, MinDiff,
and MaxRel, Fs(1, 195)! 41.44, 36.64, 25.02, and 27.65, all ps$
.001, respectively, and MaxOwn, F(1, 195) ! 9.76, p $ .01); and
for perceived morality, F(1, 195) ! 12.12, p $ .01. As predicted,
we found no effects for perceived strength, F(1, 195) ! 1.61, ns.
With respect to the affective outcomes, we found the predicted
detrimental effects of the noise-versus-no-noise contrast, F(1,
195) ! 23.76, p $ .001, on positive affect, whereas we found
somewhat weaker support for the notion that noise promoted
negative affect, F(1, 195) ! 3.00, p ! .09.
Main effects for partner’s strategy. We found main effects of
partner’s strategy for cooperation, F(2, 194) ! 21.30, p $ .001;
trust, F(2, 195) ! 46.15, p $ .001; and all perceived transforma-
tions: MaxJoint, MaxOther, MinDiff, MaxRel, and MaxOwn,
Fs(2, 195) ! 78.73, 55.00, 61.46, 48.24, and 45.02, all ps $ .001,
respectively. We also found main effects for partner’s strategy for
perceived morality, F(2, 195) ! 53.72, p $ .001; perceived
strength, F(2, 195) ! 9.72, p $ .001; positive affect, F(2, 195) !
61.18, p $ .001; and negative affect, F(2, 195) ! 42.47, p $ .001.
As can be seen in Table 3, the cooperative partner scored highest
on cooperation and on trust and elicitation of positive affect and
lowest on elicitation of negative affect and on perceived strength.
For significance tests of differences between the means, see sub-
scripts in Table 3.
Interaction effects of noise and partner’s strategy. Were the
effects of noise more pronounced for a tit-for-tat partner than for
both unconditional partners (Hypothesis 2)? To find support for
this hypothesis, the analysis should yield a significant interaction
between the noise-versus-no-noise contrast and the tit-for-tat-
versus-unconditional-strategies contrast. Also, we should find sig-
nificant effects of the noise-versus-no-noise contrast for the tit-
for-tat partner, whereas these effects should be absent for the two
unconditional strategies. As we demonstrate below, we found
strong support for this pattern for cooperation, trust, three types of
perceived transformations (i.e., MaxJoint, MinDiff, and Max-
Own), perceived morality, and positive affect, thereby supporting
our Hypotheses 2a through 2e. Relevant means are displayed in
Tables 3 and 4.
For cooperation, the predicted interaction effect between the
noise-versus-no-noise contrast and the tit-for-tat-versus-
unconditional-strategies contrast was significant, F(1, 194) !
4.02, p $ .05. Moreover, simple main effect analysis yielded an
effect for the noise-versus-no-noise contrast for the tit-for-tat part-
ner, F(1, 194) ! 5.53, p $ .05, but no effects for the contrast for
the cooperative partner, F(1, 194) $ 1, ns, or the noncooperative
partner, F(1, 194) $ 1, ns.8 Thus, as predicted in Hypothesis 2a,
the detrimental effects of noise on cooperation were more pro-
nounced for the tit-for-tat partner than for the cooperative partner
and the noncooperative partner.
For trust, the predicted interaction effect between the noise-
versus-no-noise contrast and the tit-for-tat-versus-unconditional-
strategies contrast was significant, F(1, 195) ! 4.29, p $ .05.
Moreover, the analysis yielded the predicted effect for the no-
noise-versus-noise contrast for the tit-for-tat partner, F(1, 195) !
17.26, p$ .001, and the noncooperative partner, F(1, 195)! 5.20,
p $ .05, but no effects for the cooperative partner, F(1, 195) $ 1,
ns. Thus, our Hypothesis 2b was largely supported: The detrimen-
tal effects of noise on trust were more pronounced for the tit-for-tat
partner than for the cooperative partner, but the noncooperative
partner was also affected by noise.
For all perceived transformations except MaxOther, we found
significant—albeit some marginally—interaction effects between
the noise-versus-no-noise contrast and the tit-for-tat-versus-
unconditional-strategies contrast: For MinDiff and MaxJoint, Fs(1,
195) ! 8.39 and 31.67, ps $ .01 and .001, respectively; and for
MaxRel and MaxOwn, Fs(1, 195) ! 3.00 and 3.08, ps ! .09 and
.08, respectively. Simple main effects analysis revealed the pre-
dicted pattern for MaxJoint and MaxOwn, that is, effects for the
noise-versus-no-noise contrast for the tit-for-tat partner, Fs(1,
195) ! 70.46 and 10.82, both ps $ .001, respectively, but no
effects for the noncooperative partner, Fs(1, 195)! 1.76 and 2.93,
both ns, or the cooperative partner, Fs(1, 195) ! 2.19 and 0.23,
both ns. For MinDiff, we found effects of the contrast for both the
tit-for-tat partner and the noncooperative partner, Fs(1, 195) !
28.27 and 10.26, ps $ .001 and .05, respectively, but not for the
cooperative partner, F(1, 195) ! 1.13, ns. For MaxRel, the anal-
ysis revealed effects of the noise-versus-no-noise contrast for all
partners, Fs(1, 195) ! 20.27, 5.87, and 5.03, ps $ .001, .05, and
.05, for the tit-for-tat partner, the noncooperative partner, and the
cooperative partner, respectively. Inspection of the means indi-
7 All secondary dependent variables that were used in this article were
not used before in studies examining strategies and noise. Van Lange et al.
(2002) assessed participants’ general impressions of benign intent of the
partner. We also used this measure, which supported our hypotheses.
Positive items of this scale were “The other was generous, nice, forgiving,
kind, trustworthy,” and negative items were “The other was self-centered,
greedy, competitive, stingy, vengeful, selfish” (Cronbach’s # ! .90).
Participants could indicate how much they agreed versus disagreed with
these statements on scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally
agree). We found effects for the noise-versus-no-noise contrast, F(1,
195) ! 28.87, p $ .001, and for partner’s strategy, F(1, 195) ! 116.91,
p $ .001, as well as a significant interaction effect for the two contrasts,
F(1, 195) ! 17.68, p $ .001. Moreover, the analysis yielded a significant
effect for the noise-versus-no-noise contrast for the tit-for-tat partner, F(1,
195) ! 43.72, p $ .001, but no effects for the cooperative partner, F(1,
195) ! 2.56, ns, or the noncooperative partner, F(1, 195) ! 1.49, ns.
8 The analysis did not reveal any significant interaction effects involving
blocks of trials, F(6, 585) ! 1.23, F(6, 585) $ 1, and F(12, 585) $ 1, all ns,
for Strategy " Blocks, Noise " Blocks, and Strategy " Noise " Blocks,
respectively. These results indicate that there were no differences in the
development of cooperation levels among conditions. This is perhaps not
surprising as the strategies used in Study 1 (unconditional cooperation and
unconditional noncooperation) were very clear and thus revealed their true
intentions from the start. Further analyses that examined possible interaction
effects of the noise-versus-no-noise contrast and the linear polynomial contrast
within each partner’s strategy revealed no significant effects.
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cates that for all the partners, participants perceived the relative
gain transformations (i.e., competition) more when noise was
present than noise was absent. As noted earlier, we found no
interaction effects between the two contrasts for MaxOther, F(1,
195) ! 2.04, ns.
For perceived morality, the predicted interaction effect for the
noise-versus-no-noise contrast and the tit-for-tat-versus-
unconditional-strategies contrast was significant, F(1, 195) !
6.76, p ! .01. Simple main effect analysis revealed a detrimental
effect for the noise-versus-no-noise contrast for the tit-for-tat part-
ner, F(1, 195)! 17.72, p$ .001, but no effects for the cooperative
partner (F $ 1, ns), or the noncooperative partner, F(1, 195) !
2.84, ns. As we predicted, for perceived strength, we found no
significant interaction effects for the noise-versus-no-noise con-
trast and the tit-for-tat-versus-unconditional-strategies contrast,
F(1, 195) ! 2.20, ns. Thus, as we predicted in Hypothesis 2d, we
found detrimental effects of noise on perceived morality that were
more pronounced for the tit-for-tat partner than for the cooperative
partner and the noncooperative partner, but we did not find such
effects for perceived strength.
Regarding affective outcomes, we found the predicted interac-
tion effects of the noise-versus-no-noise contrast and the tit-for-
tat-versus-unconditional-strategies contrast for both positive af-
fect, F(1, 195)! 13.06, p$ .001, and negative affect, F(1, 195)!
4.28, p $ .05. For positive and negative affect, simple main effect
analysis revealed effects for the noise-versus-no-noise contrast
only for the tit-for-tat partner, F(1, 195) ! 33.89, p $ .001, for
positive affect, and F(1, 195) ! 7.31, p $ .01, for negative affect,
but no effects for the cooperative partner (F ! 3.08, ns, and F $
1, ns, for positive and negative affect, respectively) or the nonco-
operative partner (both Fs $ 1, ns, for positive and negative
affect). Thus, as we predicted in Hypothesis 2e, the detrimental
effects of noise on positive affect were more pronounced for the
tit-for-tat partner than for the cooperative partner and the nonco-
operative partner. We found reverse effects for negative affect (see
also Table 3).
Correlational analyses. Which psychological processes un-
derlie our findings? To address this issue, we performed a series of
correlational analyses. (A regression analysis was not judged to be
suitable because the various judgments were assessed after mea-
suring cooperation and hence do not fully qualify as a mediator;
also, we included a variety of judgments, which we expected to be
fairly strongly interrelated.) Thus, the links of cooperation with the
various judgments were assessed in an exploratory manner.
Table 3
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Level of Cooperation, Trust, Perceived Morality and
Strength, and Affective Outcomes as a Function of Noise and Partner’s Strategy (Study 1)
Dependent
variables/partner’s
strategy
Noise
Absent Low High Total
Level of cooperation
Cooperative 12.77 (4.99) 13.80 (3.60) 10.33 (3.85) 12.28a (4.39)
Tit for tat 13.55 (4.60) 11.71 (5.10) 9.38 (6.05) 11.45a (5.54)
Noncooperative 6.42 (5.67) 6.23 (4.71) 8.73 (6.45) 7.09b (5.68)
Total 10.85d (5.99) 10.63d (5.48) 9.50d (5.52) 10.32 (5.68)
Trust in partner
Cooperative 4.03 (1.21) 4.25 (0.69) 3.44 (0.96) 3.91a (1.03)
Tit for tat 3.98 (0.99) 3.27 (1.18) 2.63 (0.95) 3.27b (1.17)
Noncooperative 2.64 (1.12) 2.00 (0.91) 2.10 (0.96) 2.27c (1.03)
Total 3.54d (1.28) 3.19e (1.32) 2.74f (1.09) 3.16 (1.27)
Perceived morality
Cooperative 4.86 (1.15) 5.03 (0.71) 4.57 (0.95) 4.81a (0.96)
Tit for tat 4.94 (0.81) 4.13 (1.11) 3.49 (1.17) 4.16b (1.17)
Noncooperative 3.21 (1.20) 2.67 (1.30) 2.81 (1.37) 2.91c (1.29)
Total 4.32d (1.33) 3.96e (1.43) 3.64e (1.33) 3.97 (1.38)
Perceived strength
Cooperative 3.70 (1.04) 3.61 (0.61) 3.86 (0.79) 3.72a (0.83)
Tit for tat 3.90 (1.00) 4.33 (0.95) 4.42 (0.85) 4.22b (0.95)
Noncooperative 4.42 (0.93) 4.73 (1.25) 4.17 (1.22) 4.44b (1.14)
Total 4.01d (1.30) 4.21d (1.06) 4.16d (0.97) 4.13 (1.02)
Positive affect
Cooperative 4.79 (1.19) 4.26 (1.46) 4.23 (1.10) 4.43a (1.26)
Tit for tat 4.66 (1.36) 3.14 (1.13) 2.63 (1.08) 3.45b (1.47)
Noncooperative 2.30 (1.14) 1.94 (0.97) 2.07 (1.48) 2.11c (1.20)
Total 3.90d (1.68) 3.13e (1.53) 2.99e (1.50) 3.34 (1.62)
Negative affect
Cooperative 2.65 (1.28) 2.27 (0.88) 2.68 (1.15) 2.54a (1.12)
Tit for tat 2.39 (0.95) 3.36 (1.32) 3.33 (1.74) 3.03b (1.45)
Noncooperative 4.46 (1.31) 4.76 (1.50) 4.70 (1.93) 4.63c (1.57)
Total 3.19d (1.50) 3.45e (1.61) 3.53e (1.81) 3.38 (1.64)
Note. Means of level of cooperation are the seconds remaining after the parcel was delivered: the more time
remained, the greater levels of cooperation. Standard deviations are presented within parentheses. Overall means
for partner’s strategy and noise that do not share subscripts differ significantly at p $ .05 or smaller.
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First, we examined the intercorrelations among all secondary
dependent variables. We found that all these variables were cor-
related, ranging (in absolute terms) from r ! .32 (between nega-
tive affect and perceived strength) to r ! .81 (between positive
affect and MaxJoint), all ps $ .001. The analysis revealed a clear
distinction between two groups of variables. One group included
the positive variables: the other-regarding transformations (Max-
Joint, MaxOther), the equality transformation (MinDiff), trust,
perceived morality, and positive affect. The other group included
the (presumably) negative variables: the self-regarding transfor-
mations (MaxOwn, MaxRel), perceived strength, and negative
affect. The variables in both groups were positively correlated to
all the variables in their own group but negatively correlated to all
the variables in the other group.
Now how do these two groups of variables relate to the main
dependent variable, level of cooperation? For the positive group,
we found significant correlations with cooperation for all but one
variable: MaxJoint (r! .29, p$ .01), positive affect (r! .22, p$
.01), trust (r ! .19, p $ .01), MinDiff (r ! .18, p $ .01), and
perceived morality (r ! .16, p $ .05). MaxOther was not related
to cooperation levels (r ! .027, ns). For the negative group, we
found (marginally) significant correlations for negative affect (r !
%.36, p $ .001), MaxRel (r ! %.14, p $ .05), and MaxOwn (r !
%.13, p ! .06). Perceived strength was not correlated to cooper-
ation (r ! %.026, ns).
Thus, the correlational analyses provide preliminary support for
the idea that an atmosphere of trust and benign intent may promote
cooperative interaction and may be shaped by cooperative
interaction. As such, the impression that the partner has benign
intentions (translated into other-regarding transformations, trust,
and perceived morality) rather than malignant intentions (trans-
lated into self-regarding transformations) may be crucial for the
development of cooperation levels. The finding that perceived
strength, which is less strongly linked to intentions (if at all), was
virtually uncorrelated with cooperation, is also in line with this
argument. We further suggest that the strong affective reactions
(and their relatively strong association with cooperation levels; see
also Study 2), may be driving factors underlying people’s behav-
ioral response toward the partner’s strategy and toward noise
(above and beyond the reverse causation—that feelings are also a
product of the other’s strategy).
Participants’ tendency to reciprocate. In the introduction, we
suggested that, in addition to the building of trust and benign
intent, the tendency of most people to reciprocate others’ behavior
may be an important factor for the functionality of other-regarding
strategies to cope with noise. Were the participants behaving
reciprocally toward their interaction partners? We used two mea-
sures: a behavioral measure and a self-report measure. For each
participant, we computed a reciprocity index by averaging the
absolute differences between the cooperation level of the other and
Table 4
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Perceived Transformations as a Function of Noise and
Partner’s Strategy (Study 1)
Dependent
variable/partner’s
strategy
Noise
Absent Low High Total
MaxOther (altruism)
Cooperative 4.30 (1.76) 3.65 (0.94) 3.42 (1.07) 3.79a (1.35)
Tit for tat 3.65 (0.95) 2.48 (0.95) 2.19 (1.15) 2.76b (1.20)
Noncooperative 2.31 (1.35) 1.49 (0.95) 1.40 (0.68) 1.76c (1.11)
Total 3.40d (1.61) 2.56e (1.29) 2.36e (1.28) 2.78 (1.47)
MaxJoint (cooperation)
Cooperative 4.91 (1.84) 4.89 (1.26) 3.99 (1.22) 4.59a (1.51)
Tit for tat 5.33 (1.03) 2.87 (1.39) 2.40 (1.12) 3.50b (1.75)
Noncooperative 2.14 (1.17) 1.75 (1.33) 1.67 (0.89) 1.86c (1.15)
Total 4.10d (1.99) 3.20e (1.86) 2.70f (1.44) 3.34 (1.86)
MinDiff (equality)
Cooperative 4.80 (1.99) 4.71 (1.16) 4.14 (1.00) 4.55a (1.46)
Tit for tat 4.81 (1.25) 3.22 (1.62) 2.73 (1.35) 3.56b (1.65)
Noncooperative 2.49 (1.33) 1.71 (1.33) 1.62 (1.09) 1.96c (1.30)
Total 4.01d (1.89) 3.24e (1.84) 2.86e (1.53) 3.37 (1.82)
MaxOwn (individualism)
Cooperative 3.04 (1.61) 3.03 (0.96) 3.39 (1.02) 3.16a (1.23)
Tit for tat 3.78 (1.19) 4.65 (1.66) 5.21 (1.32) 4.57b (1.50)
Noncooperative 5.03 (1.51) 5.75 (1.32) 5.54 (1.84) 5.42c (1.57)
Total 3.97d (1.65) 4.45e (1.74) 4.71e (1.68) 4.37 (1.71)
MaxRel (competition)
Cooperative 2.74 (1.54) 3.32 (1.20) 3.75 (1.03) 3.27a (1.33)
Tit for tat 3.55 (1.40) 4.90 (1.36) 5.35 (1.34) 4.62b (1.56)
Noncooperative 5.06 (1.69) 6.08 (1.27) 5.76 (1.58) 5.61c (1.57)
Total 3.80d (1.81) 4.74e (1.70) 4.95e (1.57) 4.49 (1.76)
Note. Standard deviations are presented within parentheses. Overall means for partner’s strategy and noise that
do not share subscripts differ significantly at p $ .05 or smaller. MaxJoint ! enhancing joint outcomes;
MinDiff ! minimizing (absolute) differences between own and partner’s outcomes; MaxOther ! enhancing the
partner’s outcome; MaxRel ! enhancing relative advantage over partner’s outcomes; MaxOwn ! enhancing
one’s own outcomes.
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the cooperation level of the participant. The higher participants
scored on this index, the lower was their reciprocal behavior. The
theoretical range of the scores within the index was 20, ranging
from 0 (strict reciprocation) to 20 (maximum possible difference).
We divided the participants into five equivalent reciprocity cate-
gories, each with a range of 4 s (thereby acknowledging some
inherent variability). As we expected, almost 60% (58.8%) of the
participants were represented in the first category (ranging from 0
to 4 s difference) of the reciprocity index, indicating that the
majority of the participants behaved in a reciprocal manner. An-
other 24.5% of the participants were represented in the second
category, so 83.3% of the participants were in the first two cate-
gories of the reciprocity index. A chi-square test revealed a sig-
nificant difference among the five categories, &2(4, N ! 204) !
222.08, p $ .001.
These results are in line with previous research showing that
more than 50% of participants acted reciprocally (cf. Van Lange,
1999). In addition to the reciprocity index described above, we
analyzed the six items intended to measure self-reported reciproc-
ity. This scale exhibited a significant correlation with the reciproc-
ity index (r ! .49, p $ .001). A 3 (partner’s strategy: uncondi-
tional cooperation, tit for tat, or unconditional noncooperation) "
3 (noise: absent, low noise, or high noise) ANOVA did not reveal
any significant effects for noise, F(2, 194) ! 1.13, ns, or for
partner’s strategy, F(2, 194) ! 1.52, ns. Neither did the analysis
reveal a significant interaction effect, F(4, 194) ! 1.23, ns. These
results indicate that participants’ reported levels of reciprocity
were not significantly different between the conditions.
To summarize, Study 1 provided strong support for our frame-
work. First, although noise did not exert detrimental effects on
cooperation across all three partners (no support for Hypothesis 1a,
but see Hypothesis 2a), noise exerted detrimental effects on trust
(Hypothesis 1b). Also, noise challenged perception of other-
regarding transformations to the partner and promoted the percep-
tion of self-regarding transformations (Hypothesis 1c). Addition-
ally, noise challenged judgments of morality but did not challenge
judgments of strength (Hypothesis 1d), and noise challenged pos-
itive feelings and promoted negative feelings regarding the partner
(Hypothesis 1e). Second, the results consistently revealed that the
effects of noise were more pronounced for the tit-for-tat partner
than for the unconditional partners for cooperation (Hypothesis
2a), trust in the partner (Hypothesis 2b), the perception of three
transformations (i.e., MaxJoint, MinDiff, and MaxOwn; Hypoth-
esis 2c), judgments of morality (Hypothesis 2d), and the experi-
ence of positive and negative feelings (Hypothesis 2e).
Most importantly, relative to tit for tat, unconditional coopera-
tion (i.e., maximizing joint outcomes, maximizing other’s out-
comes) turned out to be an effective strategy in coping with noise.
When an individual adopted this other-regarding strategy, noise
exerted no negative effects on trust and perception of other-
regarding transformations of this person. This is a remarkable
finding because previous research has shown that unconditionally
cooperative partners are often exploited. A possible explanation
may be that participants are more impressed by cooperative
behavior that takes effort (i.e., delivery of parcels) than by
receiving a certain number of virtual coins and as a conse-
quence are less motivated to exploit the partner. Another ex-
planation may be that the variability inherently present in the
environment called for clearer communication of trust and
benign intentions. That is, an unconditionally cooperative strat-
egy leaves little if any doubt about its intentions: communicat-
ing very cooperative intentions (i.e., maximization of joint and
other’s outcomes) at every interaction may make unintended
errors that occur occasionally matter less.
Study 2
In Study 2, we sought to extend and complement Study 1 by
comparing tit for tat with two strategies that were conditional
(rather than unconditional, as in Study 1), in that they often tended
to reciprocate the partner’s behavior in the previous interaction; as
such, these conditional strategies are characterized by equality in
outcomes (see Table 1). At the same time, the strategies differed in
that they either delivered the parcel 4 s faster than the partner did
in the previous situation (generous), or delivered the parcel 4 s
slower than the partner did in the previous situation (stingy). We
refer to these strategies as generous and stingy because generosity
is defined in terms of acting more cooperatively than a partner (i.e.,
combining MaxJoint/MaxOther with MinDiff), whereas stinginess
is defined in terms of acting less cooperatively than a partner
(combining MaxOwn/MaxRel with MinDiff; see Bendor et al.,
1991; Kollock, 1993; Van Lange et al., 2002). As such, Study 2
extended Study 1 in at least two important respects.
First, the generous and stingy strategies are more realistic than
the unconditional strategies examined in Study 1. In particular, the
unconditionally cooperative strategy is not widely used because
people are averse to the risk of exploitation either in an economical
sense (getting lower outcomes than others) or in a psychological
sense (e.g., the feeling of being the sucker; cf. Vohs, Baumeister,
& Chin, 2007). Indeed, most people tend to converge on a strategy
that is at least somewhat reciprocal in nature (see Study 1 find-
ings). Thus, Study 2 adds mundane realism to the social environ-
ment studied in the experiment.
Second, from a transformational point of view (see Table 1), the
unconditional strategies provide fairly unambiguous evidence
regarding the other-regarding (MaxOther, MaxJoint) versus self-
regarding (MaxOwn, MaxRel) nature of the intentions underlying
behavior. Indeed, Study 1 revealed that the level of cooperation
differed for the three strategies fairly soon and did not change
much over the course of the interaction. However, the differences
among generous, tit for tat, and stingy are smaller, and so, differ-
ences are more subtle and less clear. The important implication is
that the other-regarding nature of the generous strategy or the
self-regarding nature of the stingy strategy may not be perceived
immediately. Rather, these qualities are likely to be detected and
responded to during the course of interaction. Hence, it is plausible
that the detrimental effects of noise will be revealed by decreases
in cooperation over time for tit for tat and the stingy strategy and
by no decreases or even increases (i.e., learning) for the generous
strategy. Thus, we added an extra hypothesis, which we refer to as
the noise-through-interaction hypothesis.
Method
Participants and experimental design. One hundred twenty-
two participants (50 men, 72 women) with an average age of 21
years took part in the present research. They were recruited at the
campus of the VU University by printed flyers. Each participant
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was paid €5 in exchange for participation (at the time the exper-
iment was conducted, €5 equaled $5 in American currency). The
experimental design was a 3 (partner’s strategy: generous, tit for
tat, or stingy) " 2 (noise: absent or present) " 3 (blocks of trials)
ANOVA, with the latter variable being a within-participant vari-
able (this variable is discussed shortly). The primary dependent
variable was level of cooperation.
Procedure. The procedure of Study 2 was identical to the
procedure of Study 1 except for differences in the initial choice of
the preprogrammed partners and the distribution of the noise over
the trials. These differences are discussed in greater detail shortly.
Manipulation of partner’s strategy. After analyzing the data of
Study 1, we decided that a moderately cooperative initial choice
would be 13 s,9 rather than 17 s as in Study 1. Consequently, all the
partners (generous, tit for tat, and stingy) were programmed to start
with delivering the parcel in 13 s in the first trial. In subsequent trials,
the tit-for-tat partner was programmed to deliver the parcel in the
same number of seconds as the participant had in the previous trials.
The generous partner was programmed to deliver the parcel 4 s faster
than the participant had in the previous trial (generous strategy),
and the stingy partner was programmed to deliver the parcel 4 s
slower than the participant had (stingy strategy).
Manipulation of noise. Prior to making choices in the social
dilemma, participants were informed about the possible occurrence
of noise during the experiment. As in Study 1, noise was implemented
by creating roadblocks on the city map. Again, we manipulated noise
only in the partner’s strategy, so the participants could only see
roadblocks that did not obstruct their way to the flag. In Study 2, we
used just one noise condition, with a noise frequency of 33.3%, which
was between the two conditions of Study 1 (25% and 50%). The task
included nine trials of which three trials (i.e., Trials 2, 5, and 8) were
influenced by noise. As in Study 1, incidents of noise were opera-
tionalized by adding 7 s to the choice of the preprogrammed partner.
Also, to induce some variability in the partner’s choices, we added or
subtracted 1 s in every other trial.
Postexperimental questionnaires. After the social dilemma
task, participants of Study 2 proceeded with exactly the same
questionnaires as in Study 1, that is, trust (5 items, # ! .83),
MinDiff (3 items, # ! .89), MaxJoint (3 items, # ! .93), Max-
Other (3 items, # ! .83), MaxRel (3 items, # ! .94), MaxOwn (3
items, # ! .81), morality judgments (3 items, # ! .91), strength
judgments (3 items, # ! .64), positive affect (4 items, # ! .90),
and negative affect (4 items, # ! .91). We also included the
reciprocity scale as used in Study 1 (6 items, # ! .67).
Results and Discussion
We analyzed all dependent variables in a 3 (partner’s strategy:
generous, tit for tat, or stingy) " 2 (noise: absent or present)
ANOVA, again using performance on the second practice trial as
a covariate in the analysis of cooperation only.10 We also exam-
ined the development of cooperation level across three blocks of
trials within participants. To test whether the detrimental effects of
noise are specifically more pronounced for the tit-for-tat partner
than for the generous and stingy partners, we computed a tit-for-
tat-versus-generous-stingy contrast.11
Main effects for noise. Were there any detrimental effects of
noise (Hypothesis 1)? The analysis revealed the predicted effects
of noise for all dependent measures: cooperation,12 F(1, 115) !
4.45, p $ .05; trust,13 F(1, 116) ! 7.51, p $ .01; all the perceived
transformations: MaxJoint, MinDiff, MaxRel, and MaxOwn, Fs(1,
116)! 20.37, 15.00, 21.47, and 14.17, all ps$ .001, respectively;
MaxOther, F(1, 116) ! 6.52, p $ .01; perceived morality, F(1,
116) ! 9.55, p $ .01; positive affect, F(1, 116) ! 9.98, p $ .01;
and negative affect, F(1, 116) ! 20.03, p $ .001. As predicted in
Hypothesis 1d, we found no effects of noise for perceived strength
(F $ 1, ns). All means are displayed in Tables 5 and 6.
These findings support Hypotheses 1a through 1e stating that
noise would exert detrimental effects on cooperation, trust, per-
ception of other-regarding transformations (i.e., MaxOther,
MaxJoint, and MinDiff), judgments of morality, and positive
affective outcomes and that noise would promote perceptions of
self-regarding transformations (i.e., MaxOwn, MaxRel) and neg-
ative affective outcomes. Also, as predicted in Hypothesis 1d,
noise did not exert effects on perceptions of strength.
Main effects for partner’s strategy. The analysis yielded main
effects for partner’s strategy for cooperation, F(2, 115) ! 10.46,
p $ .001; trust, F(2, 116) ! 28.94, p $ .001; and all perceived
transformations: MaxJoint, MaxOther, MinDiff, MaxRel, and
MaxOwn, Fs(2, 116) ! 46.75, 40.40, 39.22, 55.30, and 34.63, all
ps $ .001, respectively. We also found main effects for partner’s
strategy for perceived morality, F(2, 116) ! 24.17, p $ .001;
perceived strength, F(2, 116)! 7.19, p$ .01; positive affect, F(2,
116) ! 29.88, p $ .001; and negative affect, F(2, 116) ! 28.48,
p $ .001. All means are displayed in Table 5. As can be seen in
Table 5, the generous partner exerted greater trust and more
positive affect than the tit-for-tat partner and the stingy partner but
was perceived as weaker than those partners. Also, the generous
partner and the tit-for-tat partner elicited equal levels of coopera-
tion, were perceived as equally moral, elicited equal levels of
negative affect, and scored higher in this respect than the stingy
partner. For tests of significance, see the subscripts in Table 5.
9 Participants delivered the parcel on average in 13.49 s in the first trial
of Study 1.
10 As in Study 1, there were no between-conditions differences regarding
the covariate, and the uncorrected means were therefore quite similar to the
estimated marginal means; the latter are reported. Also, we did not include
performance as a covariate in the analysis of trust, transformations, perceived
morality and strength, and positive and negative effect. We should note that an
analysis including the covariate yielded virtually identical results.
11 As in Study 1, we do not report the overall interaction effects between
partner’s strategy and noise for reasons of conciseness. Whenever the hypoth-
esized effect between the tit-for-tat-versus-generous-stingy contrast and noise
was significant, the overall interaction effect was also significant; exceptions to
this rule were trust, negative affect, MaxOther, Fs(4, 116)! 2.38, 2.93, and 2.56,
all ps $ .10, respectively, and positive affect, F(4, 116)! 2.33, p ! .10.
12 As in Study 1, we analyzed the time (in seconds) that remained after
the parcel was delivered such that a higher score indicated a greater level
of cooperation.
13 As in Study 1, we also assessed participants’ impressions of benign
intent (10 items, # ! .90). The analysis revealed main effects for noise,
F(1, 116) ! 26.40, p $ .001, and partner’s strategy, F(2, 116) ! 59.80,
p $ .001, and an interaction effect for noise and the tit-for-tat-versus-
generous-stingy contrast, F(1, 116) ! 11.59, p $ .01. Simple main effect
analysis revealed detrimental effects for noise within the tit-for-tat condi-
tion, F(1, 117) ! 33.26, p $ .001, but no effects for the generous partner,
F(1, 116)! 3.76, ns, or the stingy partner, F(1, 116)! 1.47, ns. The means
showed the same pattern as trust.
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Interaction effects of noise and partner’s strategy. Were the
effects of noise more pronounced for a tit-for-tat partner than for
the generous and stingy partners (Hypothesis 2)? Support for this
prediction would be revealed by a significant interaction between
noise and the tit-for-tat-versus-generous-stingy contrast. Also, we
should find significant effects for noise for the tit-for-tat partner,
whereas these effects should be absent for the generous and stingy
partners. As we demonstrate below, we found strong support for
this pattern for trust, all perceived transformations, perceived mo-
rality, and positive affect. For cooperation, we found the hypoth-
esized temporal increase for a generous partner and a temporal
decrease of cooperation levels for a tit-for-tat partner and a stingy
partner, an important finding that we discuss first.
With respect to cooperation levels, we found, as expected, no
overall interaction effects for the contrast and noise (no support for
Hypothesis 2a), but we did find support for the noise-through-
interaction hypothesis, in which we predicted that detrimental
effects of noise would be revealed by a decline of cooperation over
time for a tit-for-tat and a stingy partner, but no such decline for a
generous partner. First, a 3 (partner’s strategy: generous, tit for tat,
or stingy) " 2 (noise: absent or present) " 3 (blocks of trials)
ANCOVA with polynomial contrasts revealed a significant inter-
action effect for noise, partner’s strategy, and blocks of trials, F(4,
230) ! 2.46, p $ .05, while the overall interaction effect for noise
and strategy was not significant, F(2, 115) $ 1, ns. Second, the
analysis revealed an interaction effect for noise, strategy, and the
linear contrast, F(2, 116) ! 3.53, p $ .05 (we found no effects for
other [i.e., quadratic, cubic] contrasts). Third, to precisely test the
noise-through-interaction hypothesis, we computed a generous-
versus-tit-for-tat-stingy linear contrast. Planned comparisons anal-
ysis yielded a significant interaction effect for noise and this
contrast, F(1, 116) ! 7.04, p $ .01, indicating that noise exerted
different effects on the temporal development of cooperation for a
generous partner than for a tit-for-tat or a stingy partner.14 Fourth,
simple effects analysis with polynomial contrast revealed no ef-
fects for the generous-versus-tit-for-tat-stingy linear contrast
within the noise-absent condition (F $ 1, ns), indicating that the
development of cooperation levels was similar for all partners
14 The second contrast was not significant (F $ 1, ns), indicating that
there were no differences between the tit-for-tat and the stingy partners
regarding the effects of noise on the temporal development of cooperation
levels.
Table 5
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Level of Cooperation, Trust, Perceived Morality and
Strength, and Affective Outcomes as a Function of Noise and Partner’s Strategy (Study 2)
Dependent
variables/partner’s
strategy
Noise conditions
No noise Noise Total
Level of cooperation
Generous 15.14 (2.37) 13.15 (3.34) 14.17a (3.02)
Tit for tat 13.42 (4.74) 11.80 (5.64) 12.63a (5.20)
Stingy 10.32 (3.92) 9.59 (5.63) 9.95b (4.80)
Total 13.00d (4.24) 11.51e (5.12) 12.27 (4.74)
Trust in partner
Generous 4.30 (1.20) 4.22 (0.71) 4.26a (0.98)
Tit for tat 4.17 (1.08) 3.18 (0.64) 3.69b (1.02)
Stingy 2.83 (1.06) 2.47 (0.96) 2.65c (1.01)
Total 3.78d (1.28) 3.29e (1.05) 3.54 (1.20)
Perceived morality
Generous 5.00 (1.28) 5.05 (0.93) 5.02a (1.11)
Tit for tat 5.49 (0.71) 4.23 (0.96) 4.88a (1.05)
Stingy 3.82 (1.16) 3.25 (1.20) 3.53b (1.20)
Total 4.78d (1.27) 4.18e (1.26) 4.49 (1.30)
Perceived strength
Generous 3.68 (1.16) 3.95 (1.19) 3.81a (1.04)
Tit for tat 4.43 (0.68) 4.57 (0.83) 4.50b (0.75)
Stingy 4.53 (0.93) 4.53 (1.25) 4.53b (1.05)
Total 4.21d (1.02) 4.35d (0.99) 4.28 (1.00)
Positive affect
Generous 4.99 (0.83) 4.59 (0.64) 4.99a (1.40)
Tit for tat 4.80 (0.92) 3.43 (1.06) 4.13b (1.20)
Stingy 2.89 (0.88) 2.56 (0.87) 2.73c (1.30)
Total 4.25d (1.58) 3.52e (1.41) 3.89 (1.54)
Negative affect
Generous 1.87 (0.92) 2.35 (0.98) 2.10a (0.97)
Tit for tat 1.79 (0.80) 3.43 (1.01) 2.59a (1.22)
Stingy 3.64 (1.62) 4.33 (1.40) 3.98b (1.53)
Total 2.41d (1.43) 3.37e (1.39) 2.88 (1.48)
Note. Means of level of cooperation are the seconds that were remaining after the parcel was delivered: the more
time remained, the greater levels of cooperation. Standard deviations are presented within parentheses. Overall means
for partner’s strategy and noise that do not share subscripts differ significantly at p $ .05 or smaller.
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when there was no noise (see Figure 3A). However, within the
noise-present condition, the analysis yielded a significant effect for
the contrast, F(1, 117) ! 14.34, p $ .001, indicating that the
development of cooperation levels elicited by the generous partner
was different from that of the tit-for-tat and the stingy partners. As
can be seen in Figure 3B, over all blocks, the generous strategy
displayed an increase in levels of cooperation, F(1, 19) ! 11.98,
p $ .01, whereas this increase was absent for the tit-for-tat and the
stingy partners, F(1, 19) ! 1.42 and 2.42, both ns, respectively.
Did the development of cooperation levels elicited by a tit-for-
tat partner decline when noise was present? As we point out below,
we found some evidence that it did. First, it is important to note
that at the onset (i.e., the first block; see Figure 3B), cooperation
levels for the tit-for-tat partner and the generous partner within the
noise-present condition were not different, F(1, 115) ! 1.15, ns.
Second, for the first two blocks of trials, we found a significant
increase for the generous partner F(1, 19) ! 5.78, p $ .05, and a
significant decrease—albeit marginally—for the tit-for-tat partner,
F(1, 19) ! 3.50, p ! .077. Surprisingly, we found no significant
decrease for the stingy partner (F $ 1, ns). Third, although the
means in Figure 3B might suggest otherwise, we found no in-
creases or decreases between Blocks 2 and 3 for any of the
strategies, Fs(1, 19) ! 1.66, 2.47, and 1.38, all ns, for tit for tat,
generous, and stingy, respectively, suggesting that the beneficial
effects of noise for the generous partner and the detrimental effects
of noise for the tit-for-tat partner are established between Blocks 2
and 3 and thereafter remain stable (although it would be interesting
to see what would have happened if we had used more rounds). To
summarize, our noise-through-interaction hypothesis was largely
supported: we found detrimental effects of noise—that were re-
vealed by decreases in cooperation over time—for the tit-for-tat
partner and no decreases (indeed, even increases) for the generous
partner.
For trust, we found the predicted interaction effect (Hypothesis
2b) for noise and the tit-for-tat-versus-generous-stingy contrast,
F(1, 116) ! 4.35, p $ .05. Simple main effect analyses yielded a
significant effect for noise for the tit-for-tat partner, F(1, 116) !
10.83, p$ .01, but no effects for the generous partner, F(1, 116)$
1, ns, or the stingy partner, F(1, 116) ! 1.39, ns. Participants
trusted the tit-for-tat partner more when noise was absent (M !
4.17, SD ! 1.08) than when noise was present (M ! 3.18, SD !
0.64). Trust in the generous partner was equally high when noise
was absent (M ! 4.30, SD ! 1.20) and when noise was present
(M ! 4.22, SD ! 0.71). Similarly, trust in the stingy partner was
equally low when noise was absent (M ! 2.83, SD ! 1.06) and
noise was present (M ! 2.47, SD ! 0.96). Thus, Hypothesis 2b
was supported.
Table 6
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Perceived Transformations as a Function of Noise and
Partner’s Strategy (Study 2)
Dependent
variable/partner’s
Strategy
Noise conditions
No noise Noise Total
MaxOther (altruism)
Generous 4.18 (1.34) 4.05 (0.93) 4.11a (1.14)
Tit for tat 3.41 (0.68) 2.35 (1.06) 2.89b (1.00)
Stingy 2.20 (1.07) 1.97 (1.01) 2.08c (1.03)
Total 3.28 (1.33)d 2.79 (1.33)e 3.04 (1.34)
MaxJoint (cooperation)
Generous 5.25 (1.45) 4.92 (0.94) 5.09a (1.22)
Tit for tat 5.43 (1.12) 3.15 (1.69) 4.32b (1.82)
Stingy 2.67 (1.18) 2.15 (1.15) 2.41c (1.18)
Total 4.48 (1.77)d 3.41 (1.72)e 3.95 (1.82)
MinDiff (equality)
Generous 5.06 (1.52) 4.68 (1.00) 4.88a (1.29)
Tit for tat 5.14 (1.10) 3.20 (1.34) 4.20b (1.56)
Stingy 2.63 (1.21) 2.33 (1.23) 2.48c (1.21)
Total 4.31 (1.72)d 3.41 (1.53)e 3.86 (1.69)
MaxOwn (individualism)
Generous 2.95 (1.24) 3.47 (0.87) 3.20a (1.10)
Tit for tat 3.22 (1.05) 5.10 (1.22) 4.14b (1.47)
Stingy 5.35 (1.09) 5.30 (1.33) 5.33c (1.20)
Total 3.82 (1.54)d 4.62 (1.41)e 4.21 (1.53)
MaxRel (competition)
Generous 2.65 (1.37) 3.05 (0.74) 2.85a (1.11)
Tit for tat 2.84 (1.05) 5.23 (1.32) 4.01b (1.69)
Stingy 5.50 (1.11) 5.65 (1.30) 5.58c (1.19)
Total 3.63 (1.74)d 4.64 (1.61)e 4.13 (1.75)
Note. Standard deviations are presented within parentheses. Overall means for partner’s strategy and noise that
do not share subscripts differ significantly at p $ .05 or smaller. MaxJoint ! enhancing joint outcomes;
MinDiff ! minimizing (absolute) differences between own and partner’s outcomes; MaxOther ! enhancing the
partner’s outcome; MaxRel ! enhancing relative advantage over partner’s outcomes; MaxOwn ! enhancing
one’s own outcomes.
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With respect to the perceived transformations, we found the
predicted interaction effects (Hypothesis 2c) for noise and the
tit-for-tat-versus-generous-stingy contrast for MaxJoint, MinDiff,
MaxOwn, and MaxRel, Fs(1, 116) ! 14.31, 11.24, 13.99, and
22.31, all ps $ .001, respectively, and for MaxOther, F(1, 116) !
5.07, p $ .05. Table 7 provides an overview of the F values of the
simple main effects of noise for each partner. As can be seen in
Tables 6 and 7, the results provide good support for Hypothesis 2c:
The detrimental effects of noise on the perception of other-
regarding transformations (MaxJoint and MaxOther) and the
equality transformation (MinDiff) and the promoting effects of
noise on the perception of self-regarding transformation (MaxOwn
and MaxRel), were more pronounced for the tit-for-tat partner than
for the generous and stingy partners.
Regarding perceived morality, the analysis yielded the predicted
interaction effect (Hypothesis 2d) for noise and the tit-for-tat-
versus-generous-stingy contrast, F(1, 116) ! 6.14, p $ .05. Sim-
ple main effect analysis revealed detrimental effects for noise for
the tit-for-tat partner, F(1, 116) ! 14.52, p $ .001, but no effects
for the generous partner, F(1, 116) $ 1, ns, or the stingy partner,
F(1, 116) ! 2.87, ns. The tit-for-tat partner was perceived as quite
moral within the noise-absent condition (M ! 5.49, SD ! 0.71)
but as significantly less moral within the noise-present condition
(M ! 4.23, SD ! 0.96). Participants perceived the generous
partner as very moral in both the noise-absent (M ! 5.00, SD !
1.28) and the noise-present conditions (M! 5.05, SD! 0.93), and
they perceived the stingy partner as not so moral in both the
noise-absent (M ! 3.82, SD ! 1.16) and the noise-present condi-
tions (M ! 3.25, SD ! 1.20). For perceived strength, we
found—as predicted in Hypothesis 2d—no interaction effect for
partner’s strategy and noise (F$ 1, ns) or for the tit-for-tat-versus-
generous-stingy contrast (F $ 1, ns).
With respect to affective outcomes, we found the predicted
interaction effects for noise and the tit-for-tat-versus-generous-
stingy contrast for both positive affect, F(1, 116) ! 4.64, p $ .05,
and negative affect, F(1, 116)! 5.69, p$ .05 (see Hypothesis 2e).
Simple main effect analysis revealed detrimental effects for noise
on positive affect, F(1, 116) ! 12.91, p $ .001, and promoting
effects of noise on negative affect, F(1, 116)! 20.65, p$ .01, but
only for the tit-for-tat partner. We found no such effects for either
a generous partner, Fs(1, 116) ! 1.10 and 1.07, both ns, for
positive or negative affect, respectively, or a stingy partner, Fs(1,
116) $ 1 and ! 3.55, both ns, for positive or negative affect,
respectively. As can be seen in Table 5, participants experienced
greater positive affect (and less negative affect) about behavior of
the tit-for-tat partner when noise was absent than when noise was
present, whereas, for a generous or a stingy partner, there were no
differences between noise conditions. These findings supported
Hypothesis 2e.
The data supported Hypotheses 2a through 2e stating that the
detrimental effects of noise on cooperation, trust, perception of
other-regarding transformations (i.e., MaxOther, MaxJoint, Min-
Diff), judgments of morality, and positive affective outcomes and
the beneficial effects of noise on perception of self-regarding
Table 7
An Overview of F Values of the Simple Main Effects of Noise
Within the Strategy Conditions for Perceived Transformations
(Study 2)
Partner’s strategy
Transformation
Generous partner,
F(1, 116)
Stingy partner,
F(1, 116)
Tit-for-tat
partner,
F(1, 116)
Equality
MinDiff 0.95 0.58 24.89!!!
Other-regarding
MaxJoint 0.71 1.64 32.59!!!
MaxOther 0.15 0.52 11.03!!
Self-regarding
MaxRel 1.20 0.16 42.95!!!
MaxOwn 2.71 0.02 27.55!!!
Note. MinDiff ! minimizing (absolute) differences between own part-
ner’s outcomes; MaxJoint ! tendencies toward enhancing joint outcomes;
MaxOther ! enhancing the partner’s outcome; MaxRel ! tendencies
toward enhancing relative advantage over partner’s outcomes; MaxOwn !
enhancing one’s own outcomes.
!! p ! .001. !!! p $ .001.
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Figure 3. A: Mean levels of cooperation elicited by a tit-for-tat (TFT)
partner, a generous partner, and a stingy partner under no noise over three
blocks of three trials (Study 2). B: Mean levels of cooperation elicited by
a TFT partner, a generous partner. and a stingy partner under noise over
three blocks of three trials (Study 2).
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transformations (i.e., MaxOwn and MaxRel) and negative affec-
tive outcomes were more pronounced for the tit-for-tat partner than
for the generous and stingy partners. Also, as predicted in Hypoth-
esis 2d, the detrimental effects of noise on perceived morality that
were more pronounced for the tit-for-tat partner than for the
generous partner and the stingy partner were not found for per-
ceived strength.
Correlational analyses. As in Study 1, to provide some insight
into the underlying processes, we performed a correlational anal-
ysis among the secondary dependent variables. We found signif-
icant correlations ranging (in absolute terms) from r ! .19 (be-
tween positive affect and perceived strength) to r ! .86 (between
MinDiff and MaxJoint), all ps at least $.05. As in Study 1, the
analysis revealed two groups of variables that correlated positively
to all the variables in their own group but correlated negatively to
all the variables in the other group. The positive group included the
other-regarding transformations (MaxJoint, MaxOther), the equal-
ity transformation (MinDiff), trust, perceived morality, and posi-
tive affect. The negative group included the self-regarding trans-
formations (MaxOwn, MaxRel), perceived strength, and negative
affect. There was one exception to this pattern: Perceived morality
and perceived strength were uncorrelated (r ! %.03, ns).
As in Study 1, we examined the correlations of these two groups
with cooperation levels. For the positive group, we found corre-
lations with cooperation for all variables: MaxJoint (rs ! .45, p $
.001), trust (r! .43, p$ .001), positive affect (r! .37, p$ .001),
MaxOther (r ! .35, p $ .001), MinDiff (r ! .31, p $ .01), and
perceived morality (r ! .28, p $ .01). For the negative group, the
analysis revealed correlations with cooperation for negative affect
(r!%.39, p$ .001), MaxRel (r!%.35, p$ .001), and MaxOwn
(r ! %.21, p $ .01). As in Study 1, we found no correlation
between cooperation and perceived strength (r ! %.025, ns).
Thus, the correlational analysis confirmed the findings of Study 1,
underlined the importance of communicating trust and benign
intent (rather than strength), and once more suggested a key role
for affective reactions. (However, we hasten to say that these
findings should be considered as preliminary and that further
examination of the underlying psychological processes is needed.)
Participants’ tendency to reciprocate. Recall that in Study 1,
almost 60% of the participants were behaving in a reciprocal
manner. In Study 1, two of the interaction partners were adopting
unrealistic unconditional strategies. However, in Study 2, all the
partners were variants of tit for tat (generous, tit for tat, and
stingy). Were the participants behaving more or less reciprocally
toward these more realistic conditional strategies? As in Study 1,
we computed a reciprocity index by averaging the absolute differ-
ences between the cooperation level of the other and the cooper-
ation level of the participant. We categorized the scores into five
distinct classes of 4 s (see results section of Study 1). Again,
almost 60% (59.0%) of the participants were represented in the
first category (ranging from 0 to 4 s difference) of the reciprocity
index, indicating that the majority of the participants behaved in a
reciprocal manner. The second category (ranging from 4 to 8 s)
represented another 36.1% of the participants. In total, 95.1% of
the participants were represented in the first two categories. There
were no participants in the last two categories. A chi-square test
revealed a significant difference between the categories, &2(2, N!
122) ! 53.97, p $ .01.
In addition to the reciprocity index described above, we analyzed
the six items that measured self-reported reciprocity. This scale ex-
hibited a significant correlation with our reciprocity index (r ! .25,
p $ .01). An ANOVA did not reveal any significant effects among
experimental conditions (all Fs $ 1, ns), suggesting that participants
reported equal levels of reciprocity in all conditions.
General Discussion
The major purpose of the present research was to increase our
understanding of the psychological consequences of various inter-
personal strategies in social dilemmas with and without noise. Two
experiments provided strong support for our hypotheses. First,
Study 2 revealed that noise exerted detrimental effects on cooper-
ation, thereby supporting Hypothesis 1a (this hypothesis was not
supported by Study 1). Also, both studies revealed that noise
exerted effects on trust, perceived transformations, impressions of
other’s morality, and overall affective evaluations (i.e., support
of Hypotheses 1b–1e). Second, the results revealed that the effects
of noise were more pronounced for tit for tat, which enhances
equality in outcomes, than for other-regarding strategies, which
enhance joint outcomes and partner’s outcomes (and some equality
in outcomes, in the case of a generous strategy). Study 1 revealed
that, when noise was present, an unconditionally cooperative strat-
egy was more effective in eliciting cooperation and was perceived
as more moral and trustworthy and as being more inclined to make
other-regarding transformations (and less inclined to make
self-regarding transformations) than a tit-for-tat partner. Study 2
revealed that, in a noisy environment, the generous strategy was
able to cause an increase in cooperation across three blocks of
three trials, whereas tit for tat caused no such learning effect and
the stingy strategy even seemed to cause a decrease in cooperation
across the three blocks. Furthermore, when noise was present, a
generous strategy was perceived as more moral and trustworthy
and more inclined to make other-regarding transformations (and
less inclined to make self-regarding transformations) than a tit-for-
tat partner.
Notwithstanding decades of research suggesting otherwise, tit
for tat seems not to be the best answer (or, at least, not to be the
only answer) to the question which interpersonal strategy is most
effective in eliciting lasting cooperation. This conclusion has very
important implications, as it is diametrically opposed to hundreds
of studies indicating that tit for tat is the winner (see Komorita &
Parks, 1995). Moreover, our findings demonstrate that strategies
that are directed at benefiting others are quite effective. In the
following, we discuss our findings, implications, and possible
limitations and provide avenues for future research.
The Functionality of Other-Regarding Strategies
Precisely why would strategies that benefit others (instead of the
self) be more effective in dealing with noise than a strategy that
pursues equality? In the introduction, we advanced two comple-
mentary mechanisms, both of which are rooted in the SABI model.
The first mechanism rests on the idea that people tend to exhibit a
strong tendency toward reciprocity and that it takes some gener-
osity on the part of at least one of the persons to effectively cope
with noise. Interestingly, both studies provided some support for
the notion that a majority of the participants tended to adhere to a
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pattern of responses very similar to the tit-for-tat strategy. These
findings extend prior research (e.g., Parks & Rumble, 2001; Van
Lange, 1999) by demonstrating strong tendencies toward reciproc-
ity in a new paradigm (to be discussed later) involving a small
number of alternating interactions.
More importantly, these findings give rise to a new and, in our
view, intriguing scientific puzzle: Why do so many people tend to
act in a tit-for-tat-like manner, if this strategy is so poor at coping
with noise, which we assume to be so prevalent in everyday life?
It is perhaps too early to speculate, but we suggest two possibili-
ties. First, it is logically true—as suggested by computer simula-
tions (Kollock, 1993; Nowak & Sigmund, 1992)—that only one of
both interaction partners needs to start acting in a more other-
regarding manner. So, the dilemma may be one in which they
decide who is going to take the initiative. This argument has some
similarities with international conflicts (e.g., the Israeli–Palestinian
deadlock), where taking the initiative to disarm and show good
will may be the first—but very difficult—step to peacemaking (cf.
Komorita & Parks, 1995). Second, it is possible that generosity
may become a more realistic alternative only after repeated failure,
and perhaps the time span and the number of interactions in our
studies were too limited for generosity to develop. The findings of
Study 2 provide some indirect support for this line of reasoning, in
that there was a positive learning curve for generosity, while even
a tit-for-tat strategy may over time be effective because the person
paired with tit for tat eventually realizes that it takes generosity—
perhaps as an act of giving the other the benefit of the doubt—to
revitalize cooperation.
We also advanced a second mechanism, which assumes that
repeated acts of generosity help maintain or build trust, which
helps partners give one another the benefit of the doubt when
coping with noise. We obtained good evidence for this mech-
anism as well, in that relative to a tit-for-tat partner, an other-
regarding partner elicited greater trust, greater other-regarding
transformations, smaller self-regarding transformations, and
greater impressions of morality. (The only exception is that
impressions of strength were not greater for other-regarding
partners than for tit-for-tat partners—in fact, a tit-for-tat partner
was in both studies perceived as stronger than other-regarding
partners.)
Moreover, correlational analyses revealed positive associations
between positive thoughts and feelings and cooperation, as well as
negative associations between negative thoughts and feelings and
cooperation. These results are perfectly consistent with the notion
that repeated acts of generosity feed trust and impressions of
benign intent, which has been demonstrated in prior work (Van
Lange et al., 2002). The notion that perceived strength, which is
less strongly linked to intentions (if at all), appeared to be
uncorrelated with cooperation in both studies underlines this
argument. The finding that tit-for-tat partners were perceived as
stronger (but less moral) than other-regarding partners suggests
that trust is related to a willingness, rather than an ability, to be
other regarding.
We also noted that it is plausible that the two mechanisms
described above go hand in hand, supporting each other rather than
acting in a competitive fashion. Moreover, we suggested that
generous partners may communicate and bring about an atmo-
sphere in which people are more likely to adopt a relaxed account-
ing system (Kollock, 1993), so that they are less inclined to adhere
to strict versions of tit for tat, by which they may develop relational
trust (rather than calculus-based trust; cf. Kramer, 1999; Lewicki
et al., 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998). Although the present research
did not directly illuminate these processes, it is interesting to note
that the overall affective evaluations were consistent with this line
of reasoning. Indeed, noise undermined positive affective evalua-
tions (and promoted negative affective evaluations) for tit-for-tat
partners much more than for other-regarding strategies, suggesting
that acts of generosity help maintain or improve a positive overall
mood, which may very well help people give others the benefit of
the doubt (cf. Fredrickson, Manusco, Branigan, & Tugade, 2000).
Clearly, future research could address the surplus value of acts of
generosity by examining whether generosity may give rise to more
relaxed accounting, reduced bookkeeping, and stronger forms of
relational trust.
As noted earlier, it is important to realize that information
availability appears to be a key feature of situations and is
essential to understanding the optimal strategy for maintaining
cooperative interaction. Past research that focused on noise-free
social dilemmas (in which partners have perfect information)
revealed that tit for tat is the winner (or, at least, one of the
winners) in eliciting and maintaining cooperative interaction.
As the present findings indicate, incidents of noise seem to
expose the Achilles’ heel of tit for tat. Unlike other-regarding
strategies, tit for tat under noise (a) does not give others the
benefit of the doubt, (b) does not maintain high levels of trust,
and (c) is, by itself, not able to get out the trap of noncooper-
ative interaction. Moreover, we suggest that incidents of noise
may be essential to misunderstanding (and reactions thereupon)
in relationships, organizations, and international relations,
where very poor outcomes (e.g., breakup and divorce, misman-
agement, warfare) may be rooted to some degree in incidents of
noise (cf. Bendor et al., 1991).
Theoretical and Methodological Contributions
It is noteworthy that noise not only received very little attention
but also received quite specific attention. While computer simula-
tions commonly used to study noise (e.g., Axelrod & Dion, 1988;
Bendor et al., 1991; Fudenberg & Maskin, 1990; Kollock, 1993)
are very useful for understanding the logic as to why, for example,
a pair of two tit-for-tat partners should be especially vulnerable to
incidents of noise, we suggest that such insights need to be
complemented by a “psycho-logic” to illuminate why some strat-
egies are better at coping with noise than others. This is exactly
how the present research complements earlier empirical work on
noise in social dilemmas (Van Lange et al., 2002). That is, the
present research provides new insight into the various theoretically
relevant processes (such as reciprocity inclination, trust, transfor-
mations, personality impressions, and affective evaluations) that
helps us understand why people respond to other strategies under
noise (and no noise) in the way they do.
The present research also extends earlier research by Van Lange
et al. (2002) in three important respects. First, Study 1 revealed
that an extreme other-regarding strategy (i.e., unconditional coop-
eration) was in fact quite effective at reducing or overcoming the
detrimental effects of noise. We also note that the other-regarding
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strategy used in Study 2 was somewhat more generous than the
so-called tit-for-tat-plus-one strategy examined in earlier research.
As such, the present research suggests that repeated acts of gen-
erosity that are more than simply symbolic (i.e., more substantial)
may actually also be quite effective. It is interesting to link this to
older research in which unconditional cooperation was demon-
strated to be relatively ineffective at eliciting cooperation (see,
e.g., McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Oskamp, 1971). Thus, the
present findings may well contribute to a shift in thinking about the
functional aspects of generosity—a trend that we have recently
witnessed in neighboring areas of research (e.g., research on grat-
itude, sacrifice, and forgiveness in ongoing relationships; McCul-
lough, Tsang, & Emmons, 2004; Van Lange, Rusbult, et al., 1997).
Second, Studies 1 and 2 extend earlier research by examining the
effectiveness of self-regarding strategies for coping with noise. The
consistent finding is that unconditional noncooperation and the stingy
strategy elicited very little cooperation overall, and indeed, there was
a natural floor effect such that these strategies could not further suffer
from noise. We do think it is quite important—and consistent with
the overall message of this research—to note that a stingy strategy
fairly quickly elicited noncooperative interaction. Also, Study 2
revealed that a stingy strategy (i.e., a strategy that combines
reciprocity with stinginess) fairly quickly revealed a drop in co-
operation (in the first three interactions), which continued over the
course of the last six interactions. Such findings indicate that
adding even small self-regarding tendencies to tit for tat is unlikely
to be effective at eliciting cooperative interaction. Such tendencies
tend to undermine trust, impressions of other’s morality, and
overall affective evaluations. While other-regarding strategies may
promote cooperation through enhancing trust and promoting a
relaxed accounting climate, self-regarding may reduce cooperation
because it undermines trust and presumably triggers a climate of
strict account along perhaps with tendencies toward getting even.
Third, the present research extends Van Lange et al. (2002) by
using a novel paradigm designed to capture greater mundane
realism by including (a) effort—one should actually do something
for another, as in most everyday life situations—and (b) variabil-
ity—our behavior in everyday life hardly ever has exactly the
consequences for others that we anticipate or intend, as there is
often some random variation (e.g., one is unlikely to help another
for precisely one hour, even if planned). The present findings
revealed that, even when there was no noise, the other-regarding
strategies elicited equal or even greater cooperation levels (in case
of a generous strategy) than did tit for tat. In particular, the finding
that an unconditionally cooperative strategy did at least as well as
tit for tat under noise-free circumstances is striking. Indeed, classic
research spanning 3 decades or more has repeatedly shown that tit
for tat outperforms a 100% cooperative strategy (“All C”) because
the latter is considered to be nice but too weak15 (e.g., Kuhlman &
Marshello, 1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). We suggest that
when cooperation takes effort and when variability is also part of
the research environment, the conclusion seems to be quite different:
Unconditional cooperation seems to be doing at least as well as tit for
tat. The present findings suggest that the benefits (and costs) of
generosity and even unconditional cooperation will become clearer in
future research if we do greater justice to some key elements of social
dilemmas as they naturally occur in everyday life.
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
To begin with, it is important to note that we assessed trust,
perceived transformations, personality impressions, and overall
affective evaluations after the interactions had ended. We did this
deliberately because we did not want participants’ behavior to
be affected by the questions we wanted to ask. At the same
time, we realize the costs of doing so, as this design did not
allow us to provide direct evidence for mediation. Future re-
search may complement the present research by including im-
plicit or explicit measures during the interactions, so that one
can examine the mediating role of trust, transformations, and
personality impressions.
Second, we have developed a new paradigm to capture rela-
tively mundane aspects of cooperation and helping. Clearly, be-
cause the paradigm has never been used before or compared in
some way with the more standard game theoretical paradigm, we
do not know whether some of the findings may, in part, be
explained by qualities of the present paradigm. Although future
research is clearly needed, it is possible that the inherent variability
contributes to an environment in which is important to communi-
cate an other-regarding orientation.
Concluding Remarks
How should one behave to build trust and elicit lasting cooper-
ation from others? Over the past 6 decades, researchers working in
different fields and disciplines concluded that adopting a strictly
reciprocal strategy (i.e., tit for tat) would be most effective. The
present research indicates, however, that in a world where unintended
errors (or incidents of noise) are doomed to happen, it is not
advisable to adopt strict reciprocity. Two conclusions are espe-
cially important. First, strategies that deviate from tit for tat in a
self-regarding manner—by acting less cooperatively than the part-
ner—elicit very low levels of cooperation—and fairly rapidly so.
Second, strategies that deviate from strict reciprocity in an other-
regarding manner—by acting more generously—turn out to be
more effective at coping with noise. Such strategies not only elicit
greater cooperation levels but also tend to generate more positive
thoughts and feelings by others. We believe that we have only just
begun to understand the tremendous power of generosity for
promoting trust and cooperation in real-life situations in which
unintended errors and misunderstandings are bound to happen.
15 Both Study 1 and Study 2 support this nice but weak notion, as, in
both studies, the other-regarding partner was seen as the most moral but
also as the weakest. However, both the unconditionally cooperative partner
and the generous partner elicited most cooperation across noise conditions.
These findings underline the importance of understanding the “psycho-
logic” of interpersonal strategies.
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Appendix
Items of Trust Measure
1. I trust the other person completely.
2. If push comes to shove, I do not want to rely on the other
person (reverse coded).
3. The other person considers my interests at all times.
4. The other person is concerned with my well-being.
5. I can build upon the other person.
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